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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of Case 
This is an appeal from the district court's appellate decision reversing the trial court's 
denial of a motion to dismiss. The district court's decision should be affirmed. 
B. Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On June 25, 2011, at approximately 9:30 p.m. Rhonda Trusdall was spinning circles in a 
utility-terrain vehicle (2006 Polaris Ranger) in the Catholic Church parking lot just north of 
Cascade, Idaho. Clerks Record on Appeal ("R."), p. 3. Along with Ms. Trusdall in the utility-
terrain vehicle were six children. Id. Ms. Trusdall was approached by Valley County Sheriff 
Officer Tom Cimbalik who was driving southbound on Highway 55. Id. Following the 
administration of field sobriety tests, Ms. Trusdall was placed in handcuffs and arrested for 
driving under the influence. Id. Ms. Trusdall then submitted to a breath test and was eventually 
cited with driving under the influence in violation ofldaho Code § § 18-8004(1 )(a) & 18-8005(1 ). 
R., pp. 1, 3. Ms. Trusdall was also cited for injury to a child in violation ofldaho Code § 18-
1501 (3), failure to a carry driver's license, in violation ofldaho Code§ 49-316, and 
transportation of an alcoholic beverage, in violation ofldaho Code § 23-505. R., pp. 1-2. 
Ms. Trusdall subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss and supporting memorandum 
arguing she could not be charged with driving under the influence pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-
8004(1 )(a) because a utility-terrain vehicle ("UTV") designed for off road use is not a "motor 
vehicle" under Idaho law. R., pp. 5-7 and Additions to the Clerk's Record on Appeal ("AR."), 
pp. 62-71. The focus of the motion was that the general driving under the influence statute in 
Idaho requires that a person drive or be in actual physical control of a "motor vehicle." Id. And 
a "motor vehicle" is specifically defined as "[ e ]very vehicle which is self-propelled, and for the 
purpose of titling and registration meets federal motor vehicle safety standards as defined in 
section 49-107, Idaho Code." LC.§ 49-123(2)(g). Id. Since the UTV operated by Ms. Trusdall 
does not meet the federal motor vehicle safety standards, it is not a "motor vehicle" by definition. 
Id. Thus, Ms. Trusdall can be prosecuted for operating a UTV under the influence in violation of 
Idaho Code § 67-7114, but she could not be charged with operating a "motor vehicle" under the 
influence in violation ofldaho Code§ 18-8004(1)(a). Id. 
In response to Ms. Trusdall's motion and memorandum, the State elected not to submit a 
brief and instead relied upon the affidavit of Deputy Valley County Prosecuting Attorney Ken 
Arment which appended the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order entered in an 
administrative license suspension proceeding involving Ms. Trusdall, as well as the results of a 
motor vehicle records request for the UTV at issue. AR., pp. 48-61. Oral argument was held on 
September 15, 2011, during which the State conceded that Ms. Trusdall's UTV does not meet the 
federal motor vehicle safety standards and suggested that the legislature may have simply 
screwed up when it recently re-defined a "motor vehicle" too narrowly. R., pp. 12-13. Also on 
September 15, 2011, because she elected to pursue her motion to dismiss, the State filed an 
Amended Criminal Complaint charging Ms. Trusdall with a total of ten (10) misdemeanors and 
six (6) infractions. R., pp. 14-24. 
On October 27, 2011, the trial court issued its Memorandum Opinion Denying Motion to 
Dismiss finding that Idaho Code § 49-426(3), an unrelated statute addressing operating fees, was 
dispositive of whether one can be charged under the general driving under the influence statute 
because it states in part that the "requirements of title 18 and chapters 2, 3, 6, 8, 12, 13, and 14, 
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title 49, Idaho Code, shall apply to the operation of any all-terrain vehicle or motorbike upon 
highways." AR., pp. 43-47. On November 8, 2011, Ms. Trusdall filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration arguing the trial court's reliance upon Idaho Code § 49-426(3) was misplaced. 
R., pp. 27-36. 
On February 2, 2012, pursuant to an agreement between the parties, Ms. Trusdall entered 
conditional pleas of guilty to the charges of driving under the influence, in violation ofldaho 
Code §§ 18-8004(1 )(a) & 18-8005(1) and transportation of an alcoholic beverage, in violation of 
Idaho Code§ 23-505. R., pp. 39-42. The remaining charges were dismissed upon the State's 
motion. R., p. 45. Ms. Trusdall filed a timely appeal. R., pp. 46-48. 
On appeal to the district court Ms. Trusdall again argued that she was not operating a 
"motor vehicle" as a matter of law because a UTV does not meet the federal motor vehicle safety 
standards as defined in section 49-107, Idaho Code. AR., pp. 20-39. Ms. Trusdall also 
explained, among other things, that the trial court's reliance upon Idaho Code§ 49-426(g)(3) 
was misplaced and impermissibly renders Idaho Code§ 67-7114 a nullity. Id. Whereas the State 
on appeal to the district court again made no argument as to why the literal words and plain 
meaning of the statutory definition of"motor vehicle" should not apply in this case. AR., pp. 6-
19. The State also made no attempt to support or justify the trial court's reliance upon Idaho 
Code§ 49-426(3). Id. Instead the State's argument on appeal was that State v. Barnes, 133 
Idaho 378, 987 P.2d 290 (1999) should be controlling even though the underlying statute relied 
upon by the Barnes Court has since been amended to exclude UTV's. Id. 
The district court acting in its appellate capacity issued a Memorandum Decision and 
agreed with Ms. Trusdall and held that she was not operating a motor vehicle as contemplated by 
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section 18-8004 of the Idaho Code. R., pp. 53-60. The district court also held that Idaho Code§ 
67-7114 and Idaho Code§ 18-8004 related to similar subject matter but were not truly 
harmonious, thus the doctrine of in pari materia was not applicable in this case. Id. Ultimately 
the district court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case with instructions that 
Ms. Trusdall's conditional guilty pleas be withdrawn and those charges dismissed. R., p. 59. 
The State filed a timely notice of appeal. R., pp. 61-64. 
III. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Whether the district court correctly held that a utility-terrain vehicle designed for off road 
use is not a "motor vehicle" under Idaho law. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
Appellate courts exercise free review over the interpretation of a statute and its 
application to the facts. State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 474, 163 P.3d 1183, 1186 (2007) 
(citing VFP VC v. Dakota Co., 141 Idaho 326, 331, 109 P .3d 714, 719 (2005) ). How a statute is 
to be interpreted was recently summarized by the Idaho Supreme Court as follows: 
The interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of the statute; 
those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the 
statute must be construed as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court 
does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written. Verska v. Saint 
Alphonsus Reg'! Afed. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011) 
(internal quotation omitted). 
State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 888, 292 P.3d 273, 279 (2013). Furthermore: 
It is incumbent upon a court to give a statute an interpretation which will not 
render it a nullity. Where ambiguity exists as to the elements of a crime, this 
Court will strictly construe the criminal statute in favor of the defendant. 
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State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646, 22 P.3d 116, 121 (Ct. App. 2001) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted) (emphasis added); accord State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271, 274, 92 P.3d 521, 
524 (2004) ("where the ambiguity exists as to the elements of or potential sanctions for a crime, 
this Court will strictly construe the statute in favor of the defendant"). 
B. The Court Should Not Consider the State's Argument on Appeal as the State 
Failed to Raise the Argument to the Lower Courts 
The record in this appeal is void of any argument by the State that a utility-terrain vehicle 
designed for off road purposes is actually a "motor vehicle" under the plain language ofldaho 
Code § 49-l 23(2)(g). The State raises this argument for the first time on appeal and thus it 
cannot be considered by the Court. "The longstanding rule of [the Idaho Supreme Court] is that 
[it] will not consider issues that are raised for the first time appeal." Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 
580, 21P.3d895, 902 (2001) citing State v. Fodge, 121Idaho192, 824 P.2d 123 (1992). This 
rule dates back to the Supreme Court of the Territory ofldaho in 1867. 
It is for the protection of inferior courts. It is manifestly unfair for a party to go 
into court and slumber, as it were, on [a] defense, take no exception to the ruling, 
present no point for the attention of the court, and seek to present [the] defense, 
that was never mooted before, to the judgment of appellate court. Such a practice 
would destroy the purpose of an appeal and make the supreme court one for 
deciding questions of law in the first instance. 
Smith v. Sterling, 1 Idaho 128, 131 (1867). 
The State cannot change its theory on appeal. For instance, in State v. Anderson, the 
defendant filed a motion to suppress attacking the warrantless search of his car. -- P.3d ----, 2010 
WL 4055342, *2 (2012). Specifically, the defendant argued that the traffic stop was 
unreasonably extended and that the officers lacked probable cause to search his car because, 
while the drug dog alerted on the outside of the car, it failed to alert once inside. Id The 
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defendant's motion to suppress was denied and he appealed. Id On appeal, the defendant raised 
additional arguments attacking the warrantless vehicle search, including questioning the 
reliability of the drug dog alert outside of his car. Id The Court held "[b]ecause this Court will 
not address issues raised for the first on appeal, we disregard the arguments relating to the 
reliability of the drug dog and the establishment of probable cause prior to the dog's failure to 
alert inside the van." Id citing Row, 135 Idaho at 573. Although the overall issue remained the 
same - whether there existed probable cause for the warrantless vehicle search - the defendant 
added to arguments within the issue which was found improper. Id 
Similarly, the State seeks to add to its arguments made to the trial court regarding 
whether a UTV is a motor vehicle. The State's briefing, both before the trial court as well as the 
district court acting in its appellate capacity, is completely devoid of any argument that the plain 
and unambiguous language of the statute supports the proposition that a UTV is a motor vehicle 
as a matter oflaw. At oral argument on Ms. Trusdall's motion to dismiss before the trial court, 
the State essentially conceded that the legislature may have simply screwed up when it recently 
re-defined "motor vehicle" too narrowly. R., pp. 12, 28; AR., p. 25. Now, for the first time in 
this appeal the State argues the plain language of Idaho Code § 49-123 (2)(g), which defines 
"motor vehicle," somehow includes UTV's. The State cannot raise this argument now and a 
failure to do so previously cannot constitute plain error. See State v. Perry, l 50 Idaho 209, 245 
P.3d 961 (2010). Because this Court will not consider issues raised in the courts below, this 
Court should disregard the State's argument in its entirety and affirm the district court's decision 
and remand the case with instructions that Ms. Trusdall's conditional guilty please be withdrawn 
and those charges dismissed. State v. Wheaton, 121 Idaho 404, 407, 825 P.2d 501, 504 (1992). 
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C. A Utility-Terrain Vehicle is Not a "Motor Vehicle" as a Matter of Law 
The district court correctly concluded that Ms. Trusdall should not have been charged 
with driving under the influence under Idaho Code§ 18-8004(1)(a) because a utility-terrain 
vehicle designed for off road use is not a "motor vehicle" under Idaho law. This conclusion is 
squarely supported by giving effect to the statutes at issue as they are written. 
The general driving under the influence statute in Idaho provides: 
It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of alcohol, drugs or any 
other intoxicating substances, or any combination of alcohol, drugs and/or any 
other intoxicating substances, or who has an alcohol concentration of 0.08, as 
defined in subsection (4) of this section, or more, as shown by analysis of his 
blood, urine, or breath, to drive or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
within this state, whether upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon public or 
private property open to the public. 
I.C. § 18-8004(a)(l) (emphasis added). 
Idaho Code section 49-123(2)(g) defines "motor vehicle" as follows: 
Every vehicle which is self-propelled, and for the purpose of titling and 
registration meets federal motor vehicle safety standards as defined in section 
49-107, Idaho Code. Motor vehicle does not include vehicles moved solely by 
human power, electric personal assistive mobility devices and motorized 
wheelchairs or other such vehicles that are specifically exempt from titling or 
registration requirements under title 49, Idaho Code. 
I.C. § 49-123(2)(g) (emphasis added). 
as: 
And the "federal motor vehicle safety standards" (FMVSS) are defined in section 49-107 
[T]hose safety standards established by the national highway traffic safety 
administration, under title 49 CFR part 500-599, for the safe construction and 
manufacturing of self-propelled motorized vehicles for operation on public 
highways. Such vehicles as originally designed and manufactured shall be so 
certified by the manufacturer to meet the federal motor vehicle safety standards or 
the standards in force for a given model year or as certified by the national 
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highway traffic safety administration. 
LC.§ 49-107(5) (emphasis added). Therefore, in order to be treated as a "motor vehicle" under 
Idaho Code § 18-8004, the national highway traffic safety administration must have promulgated 
safety regulations under title 49 CFR part 500-599 for the utility-terrain vehicle operated by Ms. 
Trusdall. 
However, and most importantly, neither the federal motor vehicle safety standards nor 
Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Parts 500-599 apply to utility-terrain vehicles 
designed for off road use such as the one operated by Ms. Trusdall in this case. Parts 500-599 of 
the CFR are absent any safety regulations regarding utility-terrain vehicles. As explained by the 
national highway traffic safety administration itself, "[v]ehicles such as race cars, dirt bikes, and 
all-terrain vehicles that are not primarily manufactured for on-road use do not qualify as motor 
vehicles and are therefore not regulated by NHTSA." National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, "Requirements for Manufacturers of Motor Vehicles and Motor Vehicle 
Equipment," p. 7 (January 3, 2012)1 (emphasis added). 
Ms. Trusdall simply was not operating a "motor vehicle" by law and this Court must 
therefore affirm the district court's decision and remand with instructions to dismiss the charge 
of driving under the influence in violation of Idaho Code § 18-8004(1 )(a) and transporting an 
alcoholic beverage in violation ofldaho Code § 23-505(2) for lack of jurisdiction. Both statutes 
require that Ms. Trusdall be operating a "motor vehicle," which she was not. 
Avoiding the effect ofldaho Code§ 49-123(2)(g) as written, and employing some 
creative wordsmithery, the State now argues that a "motor vehicle" should be defined as any self 
1 Available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/cars/rules/maninfo/newManf.pdf (last visited July 1, 2013). 
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propelled vehicle. Under the State's theory, a child's remote control car would be considered a 
"motor vehicle." This argument should be rejected and the district court's decision should be 
affirmed. 
D. The Intention of Idaho Code Section 18-8004(1)(a) Was Not to Prosecute the 
Act of Operating a Utility-Terrain or All-Terrain Type Vehicle 
In addition to not operating a "motor vehicle" as a matter oflaw, contrary to the State's 
argument, Ms. Trusdall was also improperly charged under Idaho Code § 18-8004. Upon the 
stipulated facts that Ms. Trusdall was operating a utility-terrain vehicle designed and licensed for 
off road use, charging Ms. Trusdall under the general driving under the influence statute 
impermissibly renders Idaho Code§ 67-7114 a nullity. Section 67-7114 reads: 
Operation under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or any other intoxicating 
substance. Any person driving or operating a snowmobile, motorbike, utility type 
vehicle, specialty off-highway vehicle or all-terrain vehicle under the influence of 
alcohol, drugs or any other intoxicating substance on a public roadway or highway 
or off-highway shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. 
LC. § 67-7114. 
Ms. Trusdall is well aware of the doctrine of in pari materia and acknowledges the 
holding in State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 3 78, 987 P.2d 290 (1999). Any reliance on Barnes 
however is misplaced and should be rejected because Barnes is distinguishable and not 
controlling here. In Barnes, the defendant argued he could not be charged under the general 
driving under the influence statute since he was operating a snowmobile while under the 
influence. The Barnes Court, limiting its decision to the circumstances in that case, held that 
under the doctrine of in pari materia, the infraction of operating a snowmobile under the 
influence is not in conflict with Idaho Code § 18-8004 and therefore the prosecutor "had the 
9 
discretion to prosecute Barnes under either statute." Id. at 294, 987 P.2d at 382. 
In reaching this conclusion the Barnes Court defined in pari materia as follows: 
The rule that statutes in pari materia are to be construed together means that each 
legislative act is to be interpreted with other acts relating to the same matter or 
subject. Statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same subject. Such 
statutes are taken together and construed as one system, and the object is to carry 
into effect the intention. It is to be inferred that a code of statutes relating to one 
subject was governed by one spirit and policy, and was intended to be consistent 
and harmonious in its several parts and provisions. For the purpose of learning 
the intention, all statutes relating to the same subject are to be compared, and so 
far as still in force brought into harmony by interpretation. 
Id., citing Grand Canyon Dories v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 124 Idaho 1, 4, 855 P.2d 462, 465 
(1993). Simply put, statutes which are in pari materia are to be construed together to further 
legislative intent. State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 378, 382, 987 P.2d 290, 294 (1999). 
However, when two statutes appear to apply to the same case or subject matter, the more 
specific statute will control over the more general statute. Id., citing V-1 Oil Co. v. Idaho 
Transp. Dep't, 131 Idaho 482, 483, 959 P.2d 463, 464 (1998). Similarly, when two statutes 
cannot be construed "harmoniously," "the more specific of the two statutes will prevail." State v. 
Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856, 858-60, 153 P.3d 1202, 1203-05 (Ct. App. 2006); see also, United 
States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 532 (1998) (later, more specific statute governs). 
Here, Idaho Code§ 67-7114 and Idaho Code§ 18-8004 may relate to similar subject 
matter but they cannot be viewed as truly harmonious. Section 67-7114 specifically addresses 
conduct involving recreational vehicles, i.e. utility-terrain vehicles, whereas, section 18-8004 
applies to any "motor vehicle."2 It is obvious the Idaho Legislature intended the conduct at issue 
2 As discussed above, a utility-terrain vehicle is not a "motor vehicle" under Idaho Code § 18-
8004. 
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in the present case to be governed by section 67-7114. This Court must presume the legislature 
means what it says in a statute otherwise the incorporation of public roadways or highways in 
Section 67-7114 is meaningless and renders the statute a nullity. If the State's interpretation of 
section 49-123(2)(g) were adopted there would be absolutely no need for section 67-7114. 
Moreover, unlike the former version ofldaho Code§ 67-7110 which the defendant in 
Barnes argued was applicable to him, Idaho Code § 67-7114 specifically and unequivocally 
applies to Ms. Trusdall. The former version of Idaho Code § 67-7110 was an unusually broad 
statute regarding the general rules governing the operation of a snowmobile. To the contrary, 
Idaho Code § 67-7114 deals precisely with operating a recreational vehicle under the influence of 
alcohol. Moreover, the defendant in Barnes was attempting to escape criminal liability because 
Section 67-7110 was merely an infraction. Ms. Trusdall acknowledges Idaho Code§ 67-7114 is 
a misdemeanor crime and has never attempted to preclude prosecution of such crime. 
Additionally, the Court of Appeals has recently reiterated that when two statutes 
arguably apply, the most specific and more recently enacted statute will govern over an older and 
more general statute. See State v. Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856, 859, 153 P.3d 1202, 1205 (Ct. App. 
2006). In Callaghan, the Court of Appeals held that although there are two statutory schemes 
dealing with the subject matter at issue, the legislative intent was clear that "forgery of a 
certificate of insurance would be punished as a misdemeanor, not as a felony .... " Id. In 
reaching this conclusion the Court of Appeals relied upon the canon of statutory construction that 
"[w]here a harmonious construction is impossible, the more specific of the two statutes will 
prevail." Id. at 858-859, 153 P.3d at 1204-05. 
The same is true in this case. Because Idaho Code § 67-7114 specifically deals with the 
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subject matter of Ms. Trusdall's case, this Court must affirm the district court's decision and 
remand with instructions to dismiss the charge of driving under the influence in violation of 
Idaho Code§ 18-8004(1)(a) and transporting an alcoholic beverage in violation of Idaho Code§ 
23-505(2) for lack of jurisdiction. 
E. The Rule of Lenity Also Compelled Dismissal 
The Rule of Lenity states that criminal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the 
defendant. State v. Barnes, 124 Idaho 379, 380, 859 P.2d 1387, 1399 (1993) (affirming trial 
court's dismissal of theft charge based upon application of the Rule of Lenity to statute of 
limitation), overruled on other grounds in State v. Maidwell, 137 Idaho 424, 50 P.3d 439 (2002). 
In other words, to the extent Idaho Code § 67-7114 is ambiguous or if there is some doubt as to 
whether Idaho Code§ 67-7114 and Idaho Code§ 18-8004 can be construed together, the Rule of 
Lenity should have compelled the trial court to construe the statutes and their application in Ms. 
Trusdall's favor. Brown v. State, 137 Idaho 529, 536-37, 50 P.3d 1024, 1031-32 (Ct. App. 
2002). 
Similarly, though a utility-terrain vehicle by law is not a "motor vehicle," should there be 
any question or ambiguity, this Court, as the magistrate court should have, must construe the 
statutes and regulations in Ms. Trusdall's favor pursuant to the Rule of Lenity. 
F. The Trial Court's Reliance Upon Idaho Code§ 49-426(3) Was Misplaced and 
Renders Idaho Code§ 67-7114 a Nullity 
As explained above, premised upon a plain meaning interpretation of the literal words of 
the statutes in question, a UTV is not a "motor vehicle" by definition. See I.C. § 49-l 23(2)(g). 
Nonetheless, without making specific findings as to whether a UTV falls under the definition of a 
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"motor vehicle," even though it does not meet the federal motor vehicle safety standards, or 
whether section 49-123(2)(g) is ambiguous, which would require that it be construed in Ms. 
Trusdall's favor, the trial court relied upon an unrelated statute, Idaho Code§ 49-426(3), to hold 
in its Memorandum Opinion Denying Motion to Dismiss ("Memorandum Opinion") that persons 
in Idaho operating a UTV can be charged under either Idaho Code§§ 18-8004 or 67-7114. The 
district court's decision to reverse the trial court was a correct application of the law. 
First and foremost, the trial court's reliance on Idaho Code§ 49-426(3) impermissibly 
renders Idaho Code§ 67-7114 a nullity. State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646, 22 P.3d 116, 121 
(Ct. App. 2001) ("It is 'incumbent upon a court to give a statute an interpretation which will not 
render it a nullity."' quoting State v. Nelson, 119 Idaho 444, 447, 807 P.2d 1282, 1285 (Ct. App. 
1991)). Section 67-7114 becomes a nullity when the trial court concluded that section 67-7114 
applies to "vehicles whether on a public roadway or highway or off-highway." AR., p. 46. In 
reality then, there is no difference between section 67-7114 or section 18-8004( a )(1) which also 
applies to motor vehicles on "a highway, street or bridge, or upon public or private property open 
to the public." Under the trial court's ruling, both statutes are applicable to vehicles operated any 
place in the state other than private property not open to the public. Idaho Code § 67-7114 thus 
becomes a nullity which is not permitted and is unequivocally contrary to the legislative intent 
behind the statute or it would not have been enacted in 1999.3 
3 Proposed as House Bill 5 5, Idaho Code § 67-7114 was enacted "to make the penalty for 
operating a snowmobile [and all-terrain vehicles] while under the influence of intoxicating liquor 
or narcotics or other intoxicating substance consistent with the same acts committed while 
operating a motor vehicle." Statement of Purpose, H.B. 55 (1999) (emphasis added). 
Interestingly, even in the Statement of Purpose the Legislature recognized a difference between 
all-terrain vehicles and motor vehicles. 
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Second, the plain language of section 49-426(3) as well as the legislative intent in 
enacting the statute requires a finding that Ms. Trusdall cannot be charged with violating Idaho 
Code§ 18-8004(1)(a). The parties, as well as the trial court agree - Ms. Trusdall was operating a 
UTV in a parking lot. Whereas section 49-426(3) expressly states title 18 shall only apply to 
"the operation of any all-terrain vehicle, utility type vehicle or motorbike upon highways." 
Notwithstanding that section 49-426(3) is an unrelated statute and not applicable to the analysis 
of whether or not a UTV is a "motor vehicle" as a matter of law in Idaho, it nevertheless surely 
does not apply to the circumstances in this case. Therefore, any reliance upon section 49-426(3) 
was misplaced and contrary to the statute's plain language, and the district court correctly 
reversed the trial court's decision. 
Furthermore, the specific provision of section 49-426(3) relied on by the trial court was 
not enacted for the purpose cited in the Memorandum Opinion. Paren three of section 49-426 
was enacted in 2000 as part of House Bill No. 561 and when originally adopted read as follows: 
Any political subdivision of the state of Idaho may, but only after sufficient public 
notice is given and a public hearing held, adopt local ordinances designating 
highways or sections of highways under its jurisdiction upon which unregistered 
all-terrain vehicles and motorcycles may be operated. No controlled access 
highways shall be designated under this subsection. The requirements4 of title 18 
and chapters 6, 8, 12, 13 and 14, title 49, Idaho Code, shall apply to the operation 
of any unregistered motorcycle and all-terrain vehicle upon such designated 
highways. Costs related to the posting of signs on such designated highways or 
sections of highways indicating the ordinance are eligible for reimbursement 
through the motorbike recreation account created in section 67-7126, Idaho Code. 
H.B. No. 561 (2000) (emphasis added). The purpose of this statute was to "give[] political 
subdivisions of the State of Idaho the ability to designate highways and sections of highways for 
4 Moreover, Idaho Code§ 18-8004(l)(a) is not a "requirement" but rather a prohibition against 
driving under the influence. 
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unregistered off-highway motorbike and all-terrain vehicle use." Statement of Purpose, H.B. 
561(2000). 
Clearly the Legislature's intent was not to render Idaho Code § 67-7114 a nullity. This is 
further evidenced by the fact that the year prior, in 2008, the Legislature revised section 67-7114 
to specifically reference section 49-426(3) as follows: 
67-7114. Operation under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or any other 
intoxicating substance. Any person driving or operating a snowmobile, 
motorbike, utility type vehicle or all-terrain vehicle under the influence of alcohol, 
drugs or any other intoxicating substance on a public roadway or highway,~ 
authorized in this chapter or in section 49-426(3) and ( 4), Idaho Code, or off road 
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. 
I.C. § 67-7114 (2008); S.L. 2008, ch. 409, § 11 (emphasis added).5 This specific cross-reference 
to section 49-426(3) is unequivocal support for the fact that the Legislature sought to have 
persons such as Ms. Trusdall, who are alleged to have operated a UTV under the influence, 
prosecuted under Idaho Code§ 67-7114. 
5 In 2009, the Idaho Legislature made one last revision to the statute so that at the time the State 
charged Ms. Trusdall it read as follows: 
67-7114. Operation under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or any other 
intoxicating substance. Any person driving or operating a snowmobile, 
motorbike, utility type vehicle, specialty off-highway vehicle or all-terrain vehicle 
under the influence of alcohol, drugs or any other intoxicating substance on a 
public roadway or highway or off-highway shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. 
I.C. § 67-7114 (2009); S.L. 2009, ch. 157, § 13. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons set forth above, Ms. Trusdall requests that the district court's 
Memorandum Decision be affirmed and the matter remanded with instructions that Ms. 
Trusdall's conditional pleas of guilty to the charges of driving under the influence, in violation of 
Idaho Code §§ 18-8004(1 )(a) & 18-8005(1 ), and transportation of an alcoholic beverage, in 
violation ofldaho Code§ 23-505, be withdrawn and these charges be dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted this J!l:_ day of July, 2013. 
r son 
Attorney :D r Rhonda Trusdall 
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